RuoYi issue4: Unauthorized Role Assignment Deletion

Vulnerability call chain

1.1 Summary

RuoYi has a missing authorization vulnerability: Unauthorized Role Assignment Deletion. 越权撤销目标用户角色，导致权限被移除。

• Attack precondition: 拥有 system:role:edit。
• Affected authorization property: ``sys_user_role.user_id, sys_user_role.role_id。
• Security impact: 越权撤销目标用户角色，导致权限被移除。

1.2 Exploit path

POST /system/role/authUser/cancel 或 /system/role/authUser/cancelAll，提交任意 roleId/userId(s)。

1.3 Key code evidence

1. ruoyi-admin/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/web/controller/system/SysRoleController.java

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-admin/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/web/controller/system/SysRoleController.java#L262

  259      @Log(title = "角色管理", businessType = BusinessType.GRANT)260      @PostMapping("/authUser/cancel")261      @ResponseBody262      public AjaxResult cancelAuthUser(SysUserRole userRole)263      {264          return toAjax(roleService.deleteAuthUser(userRole));265      }266  267      /**268       * 批量取消授权269       */270      @RequiresPermissions("system:role:edit")271      @Log(title = "角色管理", businessType = BusinessType.GRANT)272      @PostMapping("/authUser/cancelAll")273      @ResponseBody274      public AjaxResult cancelAuthUserAll(Long roleId, String userIds)275      {276          return toAjax(roleService.deleteAuthUsers(roleId, userIds));277      }278  279      /**280       * 选择用户281       */282      @RequiresPermissions("system:role:list")283      @GetMapping("/authUser/selectUser/{roleId}")

2. ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysRoleServiceImpl.java

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysRoleServiceImpl.java#L377

  374      {375          return roleMapper.updateRole(role);376      }377  378      /**379       * 取消授权用户角色380       * 381       * @param userRole 用户和角色关联信息382       * @return 结果383       */384      @Override385      public int deleteAuthUser(SysUserRole userRole)386      {387          return userRoleMapper.deleteUserRoleInfo(userRole);388      }389  390      /**391       * 批量取消授权用户角色392       * 393       * @param roleId 角色ID394       * @param userIds 需要删除的用户数据ID395       * @return 结果

3. ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysUserRoleMapper.xml

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysUserRoleMapper.xml#L38

   35  		</foreach>36  	</insert>37  	38  	<delete id="deleteUserRoleInfo" parameterType="SysUserRole">39  		delete from sys_user_role where user_id=#{userId} and role_id=#{roleId}40  	</delete>41  	42  	<delete id="deleteUserRoleInfos">43  	    delete from sys_user_role where role_id=#{roleId} and user_id in44   	    <foreach collection="userIds" item="userId" open="(" separator="," close=")">45   	        #{userId}46              </foreach> 47  	</delete>48  </mapper> 

4. roleService.c

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/roleService.c
5. userService.c

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/userService.c

3. Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause 1: Missing server-side authorization on the vulnerable operation.

The endpoint accepts user-controlled authorization-sensitive identifiers or fields, but the write/read path does not prove that the current caller may operate on the target object.

Root Cause 2: Missing object-scope or grant-bound validation.

The implementation relies on endpoint access, UI filtering, or object existence checks instead of enforcing target ownership, tenant boundary, role ceiling, or grantable-resource constraints at the service layer.

4. Recommended fix

删除前调用 roleService.checkRoleDataScope(roleId) 和每个 userService.checkUserDataScope(userId)；操作后清理授权缓存。

5. Verification after fix

• Unauthorized callers receive HTTP 403 or equivalent rejection.
• Out-of-scope target identifiers are rejected before database writes or sensitive reads.
• Role, permission, tenant, organization, ownership, or grant-bound ceilings are enforced server-side.
• Direct HTTP requests are rejected even when front-end controls are hidden.