Vulnerability call chain
1.1 Summary
RuoYi has a missing authorization vulnerability: Role Menu Permission Overwrite. 角色被授予操作者本不具备的菜单/接口权限；若该角色已分配给用户，权限会在 Shiro 重新加载后生效。
- Attack precondition: 非超级管理员拥有
system:role:add或system:role:edit。 - Affected authorization property: ``sys_role_menu.role_id
,sys_role_menu.menu_id,SysRole.menuIds。 - Security impact: 角色被授予操作者本不具备的菜单/接口权限；若该角色已分配给用户，权限会在 Shiro 重新加载后生效。
1.2 Exploit path
直接 POST /system/role/add 或 /system/role/edit，提交当前用户不可见或不可授权的 menuIds。
1.3 Key code evidence
ruoyi-admin/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/web/controller/system/SysRoleController.java
Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-admin/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/web/controller/system/SysRoleController.java#L95
92 @PostMapping("/add")93 @ResponseBody94 public AjaxResult addSave(@Validated SysRole role)95 {96 if (!roleService.checkRoleNameUnique(role))97 {98 return error("新增角色'" + role.getRoleName() + "'失败，角色名称已存在");99 }100 else if (!roleService.checkRoleKeyUnique(role))101 {102 return error("新增角色'" + role.getRoleName() + "'失败，角色权限已存在");103 }104 role.setCreateBy(getLoginName());105 AuthorizationUtils.clearAllCachedAuthorizationInfo();106 return toAjax(roleService.insertRole(role));107 108 }109 110 /**111 * 修改角色112 */113 @RequiresPermissions("system:role:edit")114 @GetMapping("/edit/{roleId}")
ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysRoleServiceImpl.java
Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysRoleServiceImpl.java#L198
195 * @param role 角色信息196 * @return 结果197 */198 @Override199 @Transactional200 public int updateRole(SysRole role)201 {202 // 修改角色信息203 roleMapper.updateRole(role);204 // 删除角色与菜单关联205 roleMenuMapper.deleteRoleMenuByRoleId(role.getRoleId());206 return insertRoleMenu(role);207 }
ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysRoleMenuMapper.xml
Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysRoleMenuMapper.xml#L27
24 </foreach> 25 </delete>26 27 <insert id="batchRoleMenu">28 insert into sys_role_menu(role_id, menu_id) values29 <foreach item="item" index="index" collection="list" separator=",">30 (#{item.roleId},#{item.menuId})31 </foreach>32 </insert>33 34 </mapper>
ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysMenuMapper.xml
Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysMenuMapper.xml#L64
61 order by m.parent_id, m.order_num62 </select>63 64 <select id="selectPermsByUserId" parameterType="Long" resultType="String">65 select distinct m.perms66 from sys_menu m67 left join sys_role_menu rm on m.menu_id = rm.menu_id68 left join sys_user_role ur on rm.role_id = ur.role_id69 left join sys_role r on r.role_id = ur.role_id70 where m.visible = '0' and r.status = '0' and ur.user_id = #{userId}71 </select>72 73 <select id="selectPermsByRoleId" parameterType="Long" resultType="String">
3. Root Cause Analysis
Root Cause 1: Missing server-side authorization on the vulnerable operation.
The endpoint accepts user-controlled authorization-sensitive identifiers or fields, but the write/read path does not prove that the current caller may operate on the target object.
Root Cause 2: Missing object-scope or grant-bound validation.
The implementation relies on endpoint access, UI filtering, or object existence checks instead of enforcing target ownership, tenant boundary, role ceiling, or grantable-resource constraints at the service layer.
4. Recommended fix
保存角色菜单前校验每个 menuId 属于 menuService.selectMenuAll(currentUserId)，或仅允许超级管理员写 sys_role_menu。
5. Verification after fix
- Unauthorized callers receive HTTP 403 or equivalent rejection.
- Out-of-scope target identifiers are rejected before database writes or sensitive reads.
- Role, permission, tenant, organization, ownership, or grant-bound ceilings are enforced server-side.
- Direct HTTP requests are rejected even when front-end controls are hidden.