RuoYi issue3: Unauthorized Role Assignment To Users

Vulnerability call chain

1.1 Summary

RuoYi has a missing authorization vulnerability: Unauthorized Role Assignment To Users. 给不可见用户授予角色，改变其 RBAC membership 和后续权限集合。

• Attack precondition: 拥有 system:role:edit，且目标 roleId 可见。
• Affected authorization property: ``sys_user_role.user_id, sys_user_role.role_id。
• Security impact: 给不可见用户授予角色，改变其 RBAC membership 和后续权限集合。

1.2 Exploit path

POST /system/role/authUser/selectAll，提交不在操作者 DataScope 内的 userIds。

1.3 Key code evidence

1. ruoyi-admin/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/web/controller/system/SysRoleController.java

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-admin/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/web/controller/system/SysRoleController.java#L310

  307      @Log(title = "角色管理", businessType = BusinessType.GRANT)308      @PostMapping("/authUser/selectAll")309      @ResponseBody310      public AjaxResult selectAuthUserAll(Long roleId, String userIds)311      {312          roleService.checkRoleDataScope(roleId);313          return toAjax(roleService.insertAuthUsers(roleId, userIds));314      }315  316      /**317       * 加载角色部门（数据权限）列表树318       */319      @RequiresPermissions("system:role:edit")320      @GetMapping("/deptTreeData")

2. ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysRoleServiceImpl.java

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysRoleServiceImpl.java#L403

  400          return userRoleMapper.deleteUserRoleInfos(roleId, Convert.toLongArray(userIds));401      }402  403      /**404       * 批量选择授权用户角色405       * 406       * @param roleId 角色ID407       * @param userIds 需要授权的用户数据ID408       * @return 结果409       */410      @Override411      public int insertAuthUsers(Long roleId, String userIds)412      {413          Long[] users = Convert.toLongArray(userIds);414          // 新增用户与角色管理415          List<SysUserRole> list = new ArrayList<SysUserRole>();416          for (Long userId : users)417          {418              SysUserRole ur = new SysUserRole();

3. ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysUserRoleMapper.xml

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/target/classes/mapper/system/SysUserRoleMapper.xml#L31

   28          </foreach> 29   	</delete>30  	31  	<insert id="batchUserRole">32  		insert into sys_user_role(user_id, role_id) values33  		<foreach item="item" index="index" collection="list" separator=",">34  			(#{item.userId},#{item.roleId})35  		</foreach>36  	</insert>37  	38  	<delete id="deleteUserRoleInfo" parameterType="SysUserRole">

4. ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysUserServiceImpl.java

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/ruoyi-system/src/main/java/com/ruoyi/system/service/impl/SysUserServiceImpl.java#L456

  453       * @param userId 用户id454       */455      @Override456      public void checkUserDataScope(Long userId)457      {458          if (!ShiroUtils.isAdmin())459          {460              SysUser user = new SysUser();461              user.setUserId(userId);462              List<SysUser> users = SpringUtils.getAopProxy(this).selectUserList(user);463              if (StringUtils.isEmpty(users))464              {465                  throw new ServiceException("没有权限访问用户数据！");466              }467          }468      }469  470      /**

5. userService.c

Evidence location: https://github.com/yangzongzhuan/RuoYi/blob/master/userService.c

3. Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause 1: Missing server-side authorization on the vulnerable operation.

The endpoint accepts user-controlled authorization-sensitive identifiers or fields, but the write/read path does not prove that the current caller may operate on the target object.

Root Cause 2: Missing object-scope or grant-bound validation.

The implementation relies on endpoint access, UI filtering, or object existence checks instead of enforcing target ownership, tenant boundary, role ceiling, or grantable-resource constraints at the service layer.

4. Recommended fix

对每个待授权 userId 调用 userService.checkUserDataScope(userId)，并禁止对超级管理员用户进行授权变更。

5. Verification after fix

• Unauthorized callers receive HTTP 403 or equivalent rejection.
• Out-of-scope target identifiers are rejected before database writes or sensitive reads.
• Role, permission, tenant, organization, ownership, or grant-bound ceilings are enforced server-side.
• Direct HTTP requests are rejected even when front-end controls are hidden.